Critical Subjects: Participatory Research needs to Make Room for Debate by Koskinen, Inkeri
 1 
 
Critical Subjects: Participatory Research needs to Make Room for Debate 
Inkeri.Koskinen@helsinki.fi 
PSA 2012 Biennial Meeting 
November 15, Session 1 
Contributed Papers: Issues for Practice in Medicine and Anthropology 
 
 
Abstract: Participatory research in anthropology attempts to turn informants into 
collaborators, even colleagues. Researchers generally accept the idea of different 
knowledge systems, and the practice of avoiding critical appraisal of alien knowledge 
systems, common in ethnography, is continued within participatory research. 
However, if the aim of participatory research is to turn informants into collaborators, 
or ideally colleagues, the ethical imperative of offering constructive criticism to 
colleagues should apply to them, too, even if they are seen as representing different 
knowledge systems than the researchers. Avoiding appraisal of alien knowledge 
systems is problematic when the knowledge systems of the researcher and the 
researched are in constant contact.1 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I would like to thank the staff of Sámi Allaskuvla, especially Nils Oskal, for their 
generosity during my short visit in 2011, and Jelena Porsanger for her kind answers to 
my e-mails. Irja Seurujärvi-Kari gave important help in organizing the visit, for which 
I owe her many thanks. I am also grateful for having had the opportunity to hear some 
presentations and discuss with some staff members at The First Nations University of 
Canada during the IAPL conference in 2010. Earlier versions of this paper have been 
presented in the Conference on the Philosophy of the Social Sciences in Copenhagen 
on 25.-26.8.2011, in the Finnish Centre of Excellence in the Philosophy of the Social 
Sciences' seminar in Helsinki on 16.1.2012 and in the VII Ethnology Days on 16.-
17.3.2012 in Jyväskylä. 
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1. Introduction 
The last few decades have witnessed the proliferation of different kinds of 
participatory, collaborative, ethnocritical and co-operative research methods in many 
disciplines. What the greater part of these methods have in common, is the attempt to 
change the relationship between the researcher and the researched from one between 
subject and object to one between subject and subject (Smith 1997, 178), and to turn 
informants, or local non-academic interest groups, into collaborators, even colleagues. 
The main focus here is on the use of these methods in ethnographic research. For the 
purposes of this paper I will call these forms of "academic engagement with outside 
communities" (Petras, Porpora 1993, 107) participatory research. Participatory 
research is mostly very down-to-earth and deals with questions and social problems 
that have weight in the daily lives of the communities the researchers work with. The 
reasons given for the adoption of such methods are mainly ethical, and when also 
epistemic grounds for the need of participatory research are discussed, they tend to be 
strongly attached to discussions concerning power inequalities: The position of a 
researcher is seen as a position of power, and researchers should be aware of the 
power structures they might consolidate by their work. The importance of the research 
subject's own knowledge is emphasized. Researchers should relinquish the idea of 
holding knowledge that would be privileged compared to that of the researched, who 
typically have a much lower social status than the researcher. Oppressed groups can, 
according to this vein of thought, be epistemically privileged, and researchers can 
benefit from their knowledge. (Finnis 2004, Hall 2005, Kurelek 1992, Park 2006, 
Wylie 2003.) Theoretical discussions about participatory research focus strongly on 
ethical issues. This paper takes an epistemic point of view, though the argument is 
nevertheless partly ethical. 
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Ethnographers generally accept the idea of there being different knowledge systems: 
people around the world have differing criteria for what is considered as a good 
argument and what is accepted as knowledge, or an acceptable way of producing 
knowledge claims. According to a widespread interpretation, these criteria are seen as 
stemming from - and as an integral part of – a conceptual framework. And the 
conceptual frameworks have especially earlier on been understood as chiming with 
cultures, understood as holistic systems that ethnographers could interpret. In trying 
to avoid ethnocentrism, ethnographers have developed research practices in which 
hasty comparisons between statements made in different knowledge systems are 
avoided: comparison as well as adjudication can be meaningful only when the 
position of the statement within its proper framework is understood. Shortly, many 
ethnographers avoid appraisal of alien knowledge systems. 
The practice of avoiding appraisal is often linked to some form of relativism. As Mark 
Risjord has noted (1998), relativism does not necessarily lead to the impossibility of 
criticism, or avoiding appraisal of alien knowledge systems. But as shall be shown, 
avoiding appraisal follows easily from methodological conceptual relativism. It can 
be discerned also from recent ethnographic research inspired by postmodern 
epistemic relativism – notably, participatory research. The ethical and power-related 
arguments given for the adoption of participatory methods do not seem to lead to the 
abandoning of the practice of avoiding appraisal. Rather, researchers are encouraged 
to adopt a strictly positive attitude towards the local knowledge of the communities 
they are studying (Finnis 2004). The main goals of this kind of research are often 
social change, emancipation and 'giving back to the communities'. Accordingly, it 
seems much more interesting to use local knowledge in research when possible, than 
to critically appraise it. The ideal situation would be one where local knowledge and 
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"western" academic knowledge could be seamlessly incorporated, and the informant 
would thus turn into a co-author and effectively a colleague. But, as I will argue, 
postmodern epistemic relativism does not offer tools to analyse and deal with 
situations where the local and academic knowledge systems clash. 
Avoiding appraisal is practicable only as long as the research subjects go along with it 
and the different knowledge systems stay at least somewhat apart. This is not always 
the case. The typical research subjects of cultural research have become more critical 
of their role as research subjects than they used to be in the heyday of 20th century 
anthropology. This change is by no means limited to cultural research; the general 
public's attitudes towards science and research have become more distrustful than it 
used to be (Carrier & Weingart 2009). In cultural research this change nevertheless 
has some unique features. An extreme demonstration of how research subjects have 
become critical of their role is the birth of a new and heterogeneous discipline called 
indigenous studies. Indigenous researchers wish to base their research methods on 
their own peoples' knowledge systems, which they hold to be different from the 
"western" ones (Tuhiwai Smith 1999). When such critical subjects enter academia, it 
becomes impractical to avoid appraisal of different knowledge systems, and it seems 
to become ethically questionable, too: constructive criticism is a researchers' due, and 
giving it is an obligation. Constructive criticism and avoiding appraisal are not 
compatible, so the practice of avoiding appraisal of different knowledge systems is 
ethically problematic when the alleged different knowledge systems enter academia. 
Moreover, if the aim of participatory research is to incorporate local knowledge with 
academic knowledge and turn informants into collaborators, and effectively even 
colleagues, the same ethical imperative applies to them, too, even if they are seen as 
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representing different knowledge systems. Their knowledge should be critically 
appraised. 
To argue for this position, I shall start by discussing the practice of avoiding appraisal 
of different knowledge systems in ethnographic research. Then I shortly describe the 
development that has lead to the establishment of indigenous studies, and the general 
aims of the discipline. Finally I try to illustrate both the practical and the ethical limits 
of avoiding appraisal of alien knowledge systems in a world where the conceptual 
frameworks and knowledge systems of the researcher and the researched are in 
constant contact.  
 
2. Avoiding Appraisal 
Maria Baghramian (2010) divides the different kinds of relativism that have been 
influential during the last century into three main groups: conceptual, cultural and 
postmodern relativism. I shall use this distinction when focusing on the ways in which 
one particular question is treated in ethnography: How does a researcher encounter 
different knowledge systems? And, to be precise, how does one treat them in 
publications? Especially some insights related to conceptual relativism have formed 
ethnographic research practices into the direction of avoiding appraisal of knowledge 
systems alien to the researchers' own communities. As postmodern relativism has had 
an impact on the development of ethnography and pointed cultural research into new 
directions, it has indeed challenged some earlier practices, but not the one of avoiding 
appraisal. 
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Let us understand cultural relativism as the claim that "there can be no such thing as a 
culturally neutral criterion for adjudicating between conflicting claims arising from 
different cultural contexts" (Baghramian 2010, 31), and conceptual relativism as the 
holistic view according to which conceptual frameworks influence thought so 
strongly that "insofar as it is a question of truth or falsity, one cannot legitimately 
compare statements made in one [framework] with those made within another" 
(Mandelbaum 2010, 68). In other words, cultural relativists start the comparison of 
statements arising from different contexts from a point where it is possible to find 
them conflicting, whereas conceptual relativists question the possibility of this 
finding. The first has had a significant role in public discussions about moral and 
political issues, but the latter has perhaps had a stronger impact on the development of 
ethnographic research methods and practices. It may be said that whereas some earlier 
cultural researchers have been (and some contemporary ones still are) cultural 
relativists and some not, fairly many have been and are – when one looks at their 
research practices – methodological conceptual relativists. 
Wittgenstein and Winch emphasized the need to doubt the applicability of our 
terminology and norms of rationality when evaluating other knowledge systems. 
According to them, it is not wise to treat religious practices as mistakes (Wittgenstein 
1967) or as unsuccessful scientific hypotheses: "Oracular revelations are not treated 
as hypotheses and, since their sense derives from the way they are treated in their 
context, they therefore are not hypotheses." (Winch 1964, 312.) Wittgenstein's 
remarks were leveled against James Frazer, who did make this kind of comparisons, 
but much before Wittgenstein wrote his comments, anthropologists had questioned 
the idea of universal cultural evolution, endorsed by Frazer, as ethnocentric and 
largely adopted methods where the kind of comparison Wittgenstein criticized is 
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avoided. Different formulations of conceptual relativism fell into fertile ground 
amongst ethnographers, and in a moderate form conceptual relativism can be 
recognized in the ways in which ethnographic research was, and often still is, 
conducted: Researchers, firstly, accepted the idea that different conceptual 
frameworks and knowledge systems exist, and secondly, they kept the different 
systems strictly apart and did not make comparisons between claims made in different 
systems. The rationale behind this was methodological: Propositions that seem prima 
facie to be very similar to ones we could make, can, in fact, when made within the 
unfamiliar conceptual framework, considerably differ from our ways of thinking, and 
if we presume to be able to understand them well enough right away to make 
comparisons to our own beliefs, we might not just make a mistake, but in fact hinder 
our own understanding of the differences in question.2  
Strong forms of conceptual relativism are problematic, since they can lead to the 
claim that different conceptual frameworks are incommensurable, which claim turns 
out to be difficult to defend (Davidson 1974). Ethnographers, who aim precisely at 
understanding different cultures, and translating between them, cannot accept the idea 
of full incommensurability and untranslatability between different frameworks. One 
of the solutions to this problem is to resort to a hermeneutical notion of understanding 
and interpreting: though the conceptual frameworks of the researcher and that of the 
researched are different, it is possible to expand the language of the former so as to 
express the meanings and nuances of the local expressions of the latter – think of 
Clifford Geertz's "thick descriptions" (Geertz 1973, Risjord 2007). Thus comparisons 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 On this point even ethnographers who disagree with all forms of relativism, 
generally agree. For example Dan Sperber, who hardly can be called a relativist, 
agrees that "resemblances across cultures may well be superficial; failure to 
understand this leads to poor ethnography" (Sperber 1982, 161). 
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between statements made in different conceptual frameworks are possible, but only 
after the slow research process that bridges the gap between the frameworks. 
However, since the hermeneutic process is often seen as never-ending, and because 
the research questions of ethnographers often do not necessitate many comparisons, 
the initial methodological abstinence from critical evaluation can develop into a status 
quo. 
By stressing the significant differences between different conceptual frameworks, and 
accordingly also different knowledge systems, researchers can at the same time treat 
their informants' beliefs, ways of argumentation etc. in a respectful manner, and still 
not take them seriously as propositions that should be accepted, refuted, or compared 
to the researcher's own claims: for example a Native American myth must not be 
compared to a scientific hypothesis even if they at first sight might seem to contradict 
each other. It is the researcher's own academic knowledge system within which 
theoretical debates happen. One of the most beautifully explicit formulations of this 
stance comes from Talal Asad: 
Why have I tried to insist in this paper that anyone concerned with translating 
from other cultures must look for coherence in discourses, and yet devoted so 
many pages to showing that Gellner's text is largely incoherent? The reason is 
quite simple: Gellner and I speak the same language, belong to the same 
academic profession, live in the same society. In taking up a critical stance 
toward his text I am contesting what he says, not translating it, and the radical 
difference between these two activities is precisely what I insist on. (Asad 1986, 
156.) 
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I would like to draw attention to two consequences of this differentiation. Firstly, 
when the beliefs, arguments and ways of producing knowledge claims of the 
researched are not appraised, they also cannot be adopted and used by the researcher. 
Of course it is possible to borrow concepts from other conceptual frameworks and add 
them to the academic arsenal; mana and potlatch are well-known examples of this. 
However, academic theoretical discussions do not happen within the informants' 
conceptual frameworks, nor do ways of knowledge production glide from their 
knowledge systems to academic argumentation. We do not see for example 
researchers invoking their age to back up their arguments, even if amongst their 
informants epistemic authority would be defined by age, nor do we encounter 
shamanistic research methods. The different knowledge systems are kept quite strictly 
apart. 
Secondly, methodological conceptual relativism is not a practicable stance for 
researchers who wish to use participatory methods and blur the difference between 
informants and colleagues. It can indeed be adopted by those who aim at multivocal 
research: all relevant interest groups are somehow involved in the research process, 
and get their voice to be heard, but the different stories nevertheless are left clearly 
apart (e.g. Rountree 2007). However, if participatory research aims further than this, 
or if the interest groups want more than just to have their story told, too – if they insist 
on having it accepted as the truth, not just listened to – then methodological 
conceptual relativism will not do. A methodological conceptual relativist will treat 
colleagues and informants (or other interest groups) differently. 
As noted earlier, it is easy to see how for example Geertz's ideas fit into the 
description offered here. But avoiding appraisal seems to be a prevalent practice even 
amongst researchers whose theoretical positions differ from his significantly. For 
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example, in the more recent constructionistically oriented3 anthropology and cultural 
research the focus has been turned towards the researchers' own societies, their 
conceptual frameworks and knowledge systems. One of the often-criticized concepts 
is that of culture, especially when used by ethnographers (Wagner 1975), and with it 
the idea of different knowledge systems being disconnected. Despite this critique, the 
knowledge systems of the traditional research subjects of ethnography are mostly 
(though indeed not entirely) left unapprised. The sharp edge of the often social, but 
sometimes also epistemic critique points to "our", not "their" beliefs and ways of 
argumentation (Nader 2011). The practice of avoiding appraisal can be and has often 
been continued within constructionist ethnography. 
As mentioned, it is easy to find ethnographic research that incorporates 
methodological conceptual relativism in its practices. At the same time it seems to be 
virtually impossible to find ethnographers who would, on the level of their research 
practices, be consistent epistemic relativists. A consistent epistemic relativist would 
have no reason not to invoke their age to back up their arguments, if amongst their 
informants epistemic authority would be defined by age, or to use shamanistic ways 
of knowledge production in their research. This does not happen. (Koskinen 2011.) 
Nevertheless, postmodern epistemic relativism has had a strong impact on ethically 
motivated theoretical debates in anthropology and the neighboring disciplines. It has 
engendered much discussion on social and cultural inequalities, and it has had an 
important role in the development of participatory research. This is because of it 
highlights the relationship between knowledge and power. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 By this characterization I refer to Ian Hacking's loose definition. When Marilyn 
Strathern studies parenthood (2011), or when Regina Bendix studies authenticity 
(1997), they focus mainly on "our" concepts, tell something about how those concepts 
have been constructed, and hold that they "need not have existed, or need not be at all 
as [they are]." (Hacking 1999, 6.) 
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As Baghramian notes, postmodern relativism is Nietzschean: all knowledge is seen as 
partial, perspective and tied to power structures, which leads to the conclusion that 
"we can do little more than insist on the legitimacy of our own perspective and try to 
impose it on other people." (Baghramian 2010, 45.) Research is seen as inevitably 
bolstering up one perspective or another, and with it, some power structure. Many 
cultural researchers inspired by postmodern ideas have concluded that if research is 
unavoidably political, it should try to unravel existing inequalities and give a voice to 
the oppressed. This is in dissonance with methodological conceptual relativism, since 
researchers who actively try to defend marginal ways of thinking and knowing, and 
empower the communities they are studying, of course take sides and commit 
themselves much more than a methodological conceptual relativist would find 
acceptable: knowledge systems are kept less strictly apart, and clearly less emphasis is 
put on the difficulty of translating. Nevertheless, if appraisal is understood as the act 
of estimating whether a belief, an argument, or a way of producing knowledge claims 
is valid or not, postmodern relativism does not encourage researchers to appraise the 
local thinking they are studying. It does not materially challenge the practice of 
avoiding appraisal, since the aim is not to appraise beliefs and ways of argumentation, 
but to empower communities and look for ways in which they could beneficially use 
their local knowledge. The postmodern researcher quite methodologically supports 
the local knowledge systems, and supporting differs from appraisal. 
	  
3. Indigenous Studies: From Research Subjects to Critical Subjects 
Avoiding appraisal is possible for researchers as long as the knowledge systems they 
study can be kept at least somewhat apart from their own knowledge systems. This 
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was clearly the case in earlier anthropology, where the academic discussion happened 
far away from the studied people, and it is still the case when the postmodern 
researchers get to choose what parts of the studied local knowledge they might use in 
their publications. But the situation is not symmetrical: it has been and continues to be 
much more difficult for the research subjects to avoid appraisal of the knowledge 
systems of the researchers. The knowledge produced by researchers is often used in 
decision-making that affects the lives of the researched, so avoiding appraisal of this 
knowledge is impracticable. It is not surprising that when the researched have become 
more acquainted with academic research, some of them have become critical of their 
role as research subjects. Let us now turn to an extreme example of what happens 
when research subjects refuse to stay in their role, and want to be treated as simply 
subjects: the heterogeneous discipline called indigenous studies that claims to bring 
indigenous knowledge systems into academy. 
The notion of indigenous peoples has gained significant political weight during the 
last few decades, much because of the active co-operation of the different activist 
groups who see themselves as representing the different indigenous peoples around 
the world. One of their most important agendas has been that of taking control of the 
ways in which indigenous children and young people are educated.  The aim is "the 
establishment of systems of education which reflect, respect and embrace indigenous 
cultural values, philosophies and ideologies which have shaped, nurtured and 
sustained our people for tens of thousands of years." (Seurujärvi-Kari 1996, 171-172.) 
This includes also higher education and research, and so in different parts of the world 
there are nowadays colleges and research centers such as the First Nations University 
of Canada and the Sámi University College, dedicated to research based on 
indigenous knowledge systems.  
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The idea of different knowledge systems is generally accepted in indigenous studies, 
and the prevailing interpretation of it is postmodern4: Knowledge is inherently tied to 
power structures, and researchers who belong to the dominant group and produce 
knowledge about indigenous people can not easily avoid bolstering up the existing 
power inequalities. This outlook often involves the Nietzschean idea of understanding 
a different conceptual framework as a violent act of conceptual appropriation: 
frameworks are seen as rigid and all-embracing, and understanding means the ruling 
using their own framework and forcing the ruled to the slots that already exist in it. 
(Kuokkanen 2006, Tuhiwai Smith 1999, Meretoja 2007.) Despite this it is difficult to 
find indigenous researchers who would question the applicability of the strongly 
"western" concept of culture when studying indigenous peoples. Quite the contrary, 
the notion is used widely and hardly problematised, and it is not difficult even to find 
"generalizations about the culture as a whole" (Risjord 2007, 416) from indigenous 
researchers' publications. Given the political force of the concept this is hardly 
surprising. 
The methods used by indigenous researchers often resemble participatory research 
methods and many research projects are very down-to-earth developmental projects 
that aspire to engage with the community. Nevertheless, in the theoretical discussions 
much more controversial ideas have been promoted, such as developing shamanistic 
research methods (Kuokkanen 2000). The message is altogether clear: indigenous 
thinking – or "indigenous philosophies" – should be accepted within academy, not 
"simply as interesting objects of study (claims that some believe to be true) but as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 There are nevertheless also indigenous researchers who tend to prefer a more 
Wittgensteinian or hermeneutical approach to the alleged different knowledge 
systems, and are inclined more towards conceptual than postmodern relativism 
(Turner 2006, Oskal 2008). 
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intellectual orientations that map out ways of discovering things about the world" 
(Garroutte 2003, 10). 
The most important aim of indigenous studies is advancing the indigenous identity 
and self-determination of the indigenous peoples. The main audience is the 
researcher's own people, so for example a Sámi researcher's work should be directed 
according to Sámi interests and preferably published in the Sámi language. The 
openly expressed goal of many of the Sámi researchers is nation-building. (Porsanger 
2005, Stordahl 2008, Seurujärvi-Kari 2011.) 
Even though indigenous researchers usually understand nation-building as a process 
of social construction, the building of "imagined communities" (Anderson 1983), the 
idea of researchers actively building nations is not new. Disciplines such as ethnology 
and folklore studies have historically had a significant role in the building of some 
European nation states. Folklorists were notably active in the building of the Finnish 
nation in the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. Since then the 
discipline has gone through an extensive self-critique due to its nationalist history 
(Anttonen 2005, Wilson 1976). The earlier nationalist research has been deemed 
dubious in many ways, and the essentialist grounds of the ways in which earlier 
folklorists represented the Finnish people are seen as especially problematic. 
Indigenous studies has been criticized similarly: indigenous researchers are said to 
take cultures and peoples for granted, and make essentialist assumptions about the 
studied groups and their local knowledge (Kuper 2003, McGhee 2008). 
If an indigenous researcher and a folklorist meet in a conference, it is likely that the 
latter would like to question some of the theoretical premises of the former. The 
practical limits of avoiding appraisal become clear: avoiding appraisal of the 
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indigenous researcher's ideas is in this case not a viable option, even if the folklorist 
accepts the claim that his ideas stem from an indigenous knowledge system. Either 
the folklorists expresses her reasons for not agreeing with the indigenous researchers' 
ideas – thus treating him as a colleague, but taking the risk of apprising a knowledge 
system which is not her own. Or she stays silent – thus denying the indigenous 
researcher the status of a colleague who deserves constructive criticism. 
 
4. Participatory Research Needs to Make Room for Debate 
Indigenous researchers have achieved something very similar to what participatory 
research strives for. People belonging to groups that formerly would have been 
studied by outsider researchers, are now researchers themselves, study their own 
communities and aspire to base their research methods on their own communities' 
knowledge systems. Clearly they are not objects of study, but subjects, vis-à-vis other 
researchers. This has significant consequences for a researcher who accepts the idea 
of different knowledge systems: indigenous knowledge systems have entered 
academia, that is, the sphere where critical appraisal of other researchers' ideas is 
usually encouraged, not avoided. I believe most researchers would agree that 
"subjecting hypotheses, data, reasoning and background assumptions to criticism 
from a variety of perspectives" (Longino 2002, 205) is an indispensable part of 
academic knowledge production, and, accordingly, that it is a researcher's duty to 
offer criticism to fellow researchers. When indigenous knowledge systems enter 
academia, the partly ethically motivated practice of avoiding appraisal collides with 
the ethical obligation of offering criticism to colleagues. 
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The practice of avoiding appraisal has been continued in participatory research in the 
name of the ethical imperative of endorsing the knowledge systems of the oppressed. 
Nevertheless, if the aim of participatory research is to change the relationship between 
the researcher and the research subject from one between subject and object to one 
between subject and subject, and to turn informants into collaborators, or effectively 
even colleagues, the ethical imperative of offering criticism applies to them, too.  
When different conceptual frameworks and knowledge systems are in constant 
contact, research methods and practices that enable the people who see themselves as 
belonging to different knowledge systems to communicate with each other on a fairly 
equal footing, subject to subject, are clearly needed. That is, participatory methods 
and practices are needed. But at the same time, when different conceptual frameworks 
and knowledge systems are in constant contact, the practice of avoiding appraisal 
becomes both practically and ethically problematic. In other words, such notions of 
conceptual frameworks and knowledge systems, as well as such theoretical stances 
towards them, that do not enable criticism between and across the borders of the 
different frameworks and systems, are less and less usable in ethnography. They do 
not lend themselves well to the articulation of the aims of participatory research. 
Methodological conceptual relativism suffices well for the needs of multivocal 
research, but not further than that. Postmodern epistemic relativism is inadequate in 
situations of epistemic conflict. To paraphrase Bernard Williams (1974), when 
shamanistic ways of producing knowledge claims are no longer only in notional 
confrontation with academic knowledge production, but have become a real option 
for researchers, there has to be room for genuine disagreement and debate between 
the researcher and the shaman.
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